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Abstract
Modern constitutions with its content of values and legal norms and universal 
ethics contained therein continuously inƪuence the paradigm of thought and the 
system of practice and constitutional democratic political regimes in the world. 
We may say that nowadays we are in the midst of the current development of 
new thoughts in the study of constitution and the practice of constitutional 
judiciary in the world, namely the phenomenon of “universal democratic 
constitutionalism.” Indonesia and all the states are experiencing the development 
of the same inƪuence, so that way of woring of the Constitutional Court as an 
institution to safeguard democracy and being the upholder of the constitution 
shall also catch the moral signs and messages behind that new development with 
a critical stance, so that each of its decisions can truly produce justice, certainty, 
and is solvent in nature vis-à-vis the constitutional problems occurring in the 
public of the respective states.
Keys word: Constitutional Court, Constitutional Ethic, Supreme Court
I. INTRODUCTION
 Nowadays the organized wise conduct of power in the joint livelihood 
of manind wheresoever and in whatsoever Ƥeld is agreed to be bound and be 
based on system of norms applying equally for all members/citizens set out 
in one document or in various forms of documents named as a constitution. 
The development of the aforesaid constitution can be seen from (i) the aspect 
of its subject: the state, the civil society, the market; (ii) from the aspect of its 
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substance: politics, integrating legal norms, social-oriented, economic, cultural, 
welfare, civic education, social engineering, social emancipating, etc.;1 and also (iii) 
from the aspect of its organization: state organization, non-state organization, 
professional organization, organization of the business realm, public organization, 
village community organization , etc.
From the aspect of the organization subject as regulated by the constitution 
it can be in the form of the subject of the state organization as well as non-
state organization which comprises corporations in the business realm or the 
organizations of public legal entities, lie the foundations, associations, public 
organizations or civil society organizations, and even political parties. All 
the aforesaid organizations require a legal document to be their guidance in 
conducting their wor which is named a constitution. Even among organized 
civil societies, I advocate to develop a perspective about social constitution which 
should have been made as one among the new study objects in the studies on 
constitution nowadays and in the future.
From the aspect of substance or its material content, the constitution of 
nowadays can be said as loading a very extensive content of values and norms, 
and not only limited to political matters as used to be understood according 
to the tradition of constitution of the United States of America being made a 
model for the drafting of the constitutions of many states in the world. The 
Constitution of the United States of America is no other than only a “political 
constitution”, wherein no rules regarding policies for the Ƥeld of economy and 
socio-culture have been loaded at all. Compared to the Constitution of the State 
of the Republic of Indonesia of 1ͥ͠͡ (the Constitution of 1ͥ͠͡) which speciƤcally 
loads provisions in Chapter XIV on National Economy and Social Welfare which 
comprises Article 33 and Article 34 regulating that policy on economy and social 
welfare. Therefore, we can say that the Indonesian Constitution is not only a 
political constitution, but it is also an economic constitution.2
1  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Gagasan Konstitusi Sosial: Institusionalisasi dan Konstitusionalisasi Kehidupan Sosial Masyarakat Madani, LP3ES, 
Jakarta, 2015; Ibid., Konstitusi Ekonomi, Kompas, Jakarta, 2010; Green Constitution: Nuansa Hijau Undang-Undang Dasar Negara 
Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, aaraƤdo, Jakarta, 200͡.
2  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi Ekonomi (Economic Constitution), Kompas, Jakarta, 2010.
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From the aspect of institutional organization which forms and requires a 
constitutional arrangement as referred to, we may put forward that such could also 
be developed extensively. Organizations having a constitution would not only be 
the state organizations, but all forms of public organizations, the business realm, 
and even in the villages being legal entities can also be institutionalized with 
the support of a document of a constitution as is practiced in the environment 
of the customary village government of the Indian tribes in the United States 
of America. In short, the constitution of nowadays continuous to develop in 
the various Ƥelds of scientiƤc legal and political studies as well as studies in 
social sciences generally. In due time all these dynamics of development will 
also inƪuence our perspective on the way how the system of the constitutional 
judiciary wors in the frame of supporting the development process in the 
progress of civilization of each nation and the civilization manind in general.
II. DISCUSSION
Constitutional Values and Norms: Law and Ethics
Among the scholars of law and constitution nowadays, the constitution in 
general is only understood as a manuscript which contains legal norms of the 
constitution (legal norms). In the past, we could not have imagined that in the 
prevailing constitutions there are also non-legal values and norms, but ethical 
norms. Let alone among the law scholars and studies in the environment faculties 
or law schools, referred to as constitution is none other than merely a source of 
constitutional law. Nevertheless, in the development of nowadays, the need to 
develop eơorts towards the system structuring of the ethical infra-structure in 
the environment of state organs and public oƥces as well as professional oƥces 
in all over the world has grown increasingly stronger. Therefore, there appears 
the need to develop various theoretical studies on “constitutional ethics” besides 
“constitutional law.”3
3  Vide Keith hittito, ǲ the eed or A heory o ostittioal Ethisǳ, 2005, vide i Jimly Asshiddiqie, Peradilan Etik dan 
Etika Konstitusi, aaraƤdo, Jakarta, 201͜.
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By using such a way thought, as of the year 1997  I have also continuously 
advocated various studies on the system of the infra-structure of ethics in the 
environment of public oƥces in Indonesia. As of the Reformation of 1998, 
Indonesia has also formed an institution for the upholders of ethics of the 
judiciary which has been speciƤcally contained in Article 24B of the Constitution 
of 1945, named as the Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial, KY). As of then, 
many state institutions and even all professional organizations have formed a 
code of ethics along with the mechanism for its eơective enforcement by an 
ethics committee or an honorary council. What is more, as of the year 2009, 
when I was entrusted to become the Chairperson of the Honorary Council of 
the Electoral Commission, an institute for the upholders of the code of ethics 
for the commissioners of that Electoral Commission, we have developed it as 
an institution for judiciary ethics of a special nature. This model of judiciary 
ethics for public oƥcers was carried on when I was entrusted to become the 
Chairperson of the Honorary Council of the General Election Committee of the 
Republic of Indonesia up to date.4
With the existence of the mechanism of enforcement of the code of ethics, 
we may expect that the system of ethical norms may support and complete the 
shortage of the system of legal norms in the control of and to guide the public at 
large towards an ideal behavior. Therefore, in the boo “Peradilan Etik dan Etika 
Konstitusi” (The Judiciary of Ethics and Constitutional Ethics),5 I have introduced 
a new term regarding “constitutional ethics” besides the “constitutional law”. I 
have also introduced a new perspective regarding the “Rule of Ethics” to complete 
the doctrine we now to date, namely the “Rule of Law”, which comprises the 
term regarding “code of law and the court of law” and “code of ethics and the 
court of ethics”. Even based on the provisions in the laws, in the environment 
of the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) it has 
also been established the Honorary Court of the DPR (Mahkamah Kehormatan 
DPR) initially named the Honorary Body of the DPR (Badan Kehormatan DPR). 
͜  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Menegakkan Etika Penyelenggara Pemilu, aaraƤdo, Jakarta, 2013.
5  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Peradilan Etik dan Etika Konstitusi, aaraƤdo, Jakarta, 201͜.
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That means, the mechanism for the enforcement of the code of ethics for the 
representatives of the people sitting in the parliament in Indonesia nowadays 
has formally been developed as a process of judiciary ethics or honorary court.
In the environment of the other state institutions and also in all the 
environment of professional organizations, a system of ethical infra-structure has 
also been developed supported by the institutionalization of a commission of 
ethics or an honorary council to enforce the applicable code of ethics. Even in the 
environment of judicial power, a special commission has also been established as 
separately regulated in the Constitution of 1945, namely the Judicial Commission 
which has the function of the upholders of the code of ethics for the judges. By 
the time all these will be arranged completely so that an integrated system of 
judiciary ethics can be established based on the principles of constitutional ethics.
The Universalization of Constitutional Values
In the midst of globalization and dynamics of relations and interplay of 
inƪuence among cultures, inter-economies, and the political systems of modern 
states, there appears also new terms regarding values deemed good to be developed 
in the practice of each state. Let alone the modern state of nowadays can no 
longer elude from the must to be active and even be pro-active in the dynamics 
of international relations.
In the aforesaid arena of the dynamic global inter-communication, the 
constitutions of the modern states as a legal document contribute mutually ideas 
deemed ideal for the development of joint livelihood in all the modern states. 
The comparative study of constitutions and constitutionalism has also developed 
very rapidly producing a comprehension regarding a system of universal values 
which integrate all the ideal aspirations of being in a state wheresoever manind 
dreams about the progress of civilization. After Amos Peaslee published the 
“Constitutions of Nations” in the year 1965,6 HTJF van Marseeven GFM van der 
6  Vide Amos J. Peaslee plished the Constitutions of Nations, J	 a arseee 
	 a der a, Written Constitutions: A 
Computerized Comparative Study, 1͟͡͠.
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Tang published “Written Constitutions: A Computerized Comparative Study7 in 
1978, then nowadays in the 21st century there are lots of comparative studies 
conducted by experts regarding the comparison of constitutions which produced 
a conclusion that nowadays, modern constitution and constitutionalism are 
undergoing a process of a very rapid universalization of values. 8
Even Professor Thomas Fleiner, Director of the Institute of Federalism at 
the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, characterizes the modern era as ‘the age 
of the constitution’ which tends to (i) ignore diversity of diơerent peoples, (ii) 
proclaim universality and inclusiveness, (iii) subsume sovereignty of nation states 
into a globalized world, and (iv) profess to recognize the worth of individuals.9
Mar Tushnet wrote also in the Minnesota Law Review (2005): “When Is 
Knowing Better Than Knowing More-Unpacing the Controversy over Supreme-
Court Reference to Non-US Law.”10 In his eynote speech at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Society of International Law (2004), Justice Stephen Breyer stated 
that “comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting 
constitutions and enforcing human rights.”11
What is more was said by Vici C. Jacson, that in quite a lot of cases, the 
judges deciding on case which are domestic in nature, have increasingly read and 
considered decisions made by foreign judges abroad as non-binding comparison 
material but applied as material to decide on a case they handled respectively.12 
As matter of course, the use of these foreign materials has given rise to its 
pros and cons per se. Included is also Chief Justice Rehnquist nown for being 
conservative strongly opposed this. For instance, in one among the dissenting 
opinions made in the case involving the death penalty, Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
“I write separately… to call attention to the defects in the Court’s decision to place 
͟  J	 a arseee 
	 a der a, ǲritte ostittiosǣ A ompteried omparatie Stdy, 1͟͡͠. 
͠  Vide, e.., eis ais, heryl Saders, ad Ala ihter (Eds.), An Inquiry into the Existence of Global Values through the Lens 
of Comparative Constitutional Law (art Stdies i omparatie Pli La, ited Kidomǣ loomsry, 30 Jly 2015.
͡  homas 	leier, Ǯhe Ae o ostittiosǯ i oert 	reh, 
eoơrey Lidell ad heryl Saders (Eds), Reƪections on the Aus-
tralian Constitution, (2003), pae 236, S La Joral 25, 2003, 26 (1), 32͟. 
10  ark shet, i. La eie, ͡0, (2005Ǧ2006), pae 12͟5.
11  Vide arold o Koh, ǲteratioal La as part o or laǳ, he Ameria Joral o teratioal La, pae ͜3Ǧ5͟. Vide also 
oer P. Alord, ǲissi teratioal Sores to terpret the ostittioǳ i he Ameria Joral o teratioal La, ol. 
͡͠, o. 1 (Ja, 200͜), pae 5͟Ǧ6͡.
12  iki . Jakso, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, arard La eie, ol. 11͡, o. 1 (o, 
2005), pae 10͡Ǧ12͠.
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weight on foreign laws. … In reaching its conclusion today, the Court… adverts 
to the fact that other countries have disapproved imposition of the death penalty 
for crimes committed by mentally retarded oơenders…. I fail to see, however, how 
the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide 
any support for the Court’s ultimate determination….”13 
Nevertheless, irrespective of the heat of the debate, the general trend indicates 
that nowadays the phenomenon of the universalization of constitutional values 
idealized in the joint livelihood of manind in all over the world is developing 
continuously. This general phenomenon is also supported by the increasingly 
developing contributions of scientiƤc research produced by quite a lot of 
comparative legal studies, ‘International Law and Comparative Constitutional 
Law‘. The comparative study of constitution nowadays has developed very 
rapidly, and therefore, S. Choudry, in the Indiana Law Journal (1999), named 
it as “a central component of contemporary constitutional practice.”14 This has 
actually been described by Bruce Acerman in his article: “The Rise of World 
Constitutionalism” (1997).15
This development can also be read in the writings of Cheryl Saunders 
(professor of comparative constitution, Melbourne Law University)16 or the 
handboo written by Mar Tushnet et al.17 describing the extensive inƪuence of 
universal values related to themes of constitutionalism, structure of government, 
and various ideas which are ‘commonly shared’ in various states in the world. Let 
alone the larger part of the various instruments of human rights being universal 
in nature and stemming from various instruments of International Human Rights 
have been made into a barometer regarding as to how far an applied constitution 
in a state is modern or not, so that one among the measures of a modern ideal 
constitution is when that constitution has adopted universal values contained in 
an instrument of the international law prevailing in the Ƥeld of human rights. 
13  aai As, ǲomparatie ostittioal easoiǣ he La ad Stratey o Seleti the iht Armetsǳ, ke Joral o 
omparatie ad teratioal La, o. 1͜, (200͜), pae 301. 
1͜  S. hodry, ǲ
loaliatio  Searh o JstiƤatioǣ oards A heory o omparatie ostittioal terpretatio”, diaa La 
Joral, 1͡͡͡.
15  re Akerma, ǲhe ise o orld ostittioalismǳ, iriia La eie, o. ͠3, o. ͜ (ay, 1͟͡͡), pae ͟͟1Ǧ͟͟͡.
16  heryl Saders, ǲhe se ad isse o omparatie ostittioal Laǳ, diaa Joral o 
loal Leal Stdies, ol. 13, 2006.
1͟  Vide ark shet et al., otlede adook o ostittioal La, otlede, 2015.
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Therefore, the phenomenon of universalization of the content of rules values of 
the constitution of modern states in the world is indeed not avoidable. One of 
the examples is the Constitution of 1945 post Reformation adopting almost all 
instruments of the International Human Rights to become the material of Article 
28A up to Article 28J of the Constitution of 1945. This has given cause to the 
most material content in articles of the Constitution of 1945 that are provisions 
regarding the constitutional guaranty of human rights. That is the reason why I 
frequently state that the Constitution of 1945 prevailing nowadays is one among 
the examples of the most modern constitution in the world.
Modern constitutions with its content of values and legal norms and universal 
ethics contained therein continuously inƪuence the paradigm of thought and the 
system of practice and constitutional democratic political regimes in the world. 
We may say that nowadays we are in the midst of the current development of 
new thoughts in the study of constitution and the practice of constitutional 
judiciary in the world, namely the phenomenon of “universal democratic 
constitutionalism.” Indonesia and all the states are experiencing the development 
of the same inƪuence, so that way of woring of the Constitutional Court as an 
institution to safeguard democracy and being the upholder of the constitution 
shall also catch the moral signs and messages behind that new development 
with a critical stance, so that each of its decisions can truly produce justice, 
certainty, and is solvent in nature vis-à-vis the constitutional problems occurring 
in the public of the respective states. According to Gary Jeơrey Jacobson,18 the 
political leaders and the judges in a state shall try to overcome the disharmony 
in determining the constitutional identity as a product of the inƪuence of the 
dynamics of universal values with typical elements in a culture living in the 
midst of the people.
The Court and the Enforcement of the Constitution in Practice
The development of the institutionalization of the mechanism of constitutional 
review in history, starting as of the controversial decision of the Chief Justice 
1͠  
ary Jeơrey Jaoso, Constitutional Identity, arard iersity Press, amride, 2010, pae 1͜3Ǧ1͜͜. 
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of the Supreme Court of the United States of America John Marshall in 1803, 
namely in the renowned case of Marburry versus Madison.19 It was this decision 
of the Supreme Court Justice John Marshall which for the Ƥrst time determined 
the inapplicability of a prevailing law as a binding law based on a decision of 
the parliament, in accordance with the doctrine of separation of power among 
the branches of the legislative, executive, and the judicative powers. With that 
decision of John Marshall of 1803, the Supreme Court indeed too over the 
authority of the Congress for determining the validity or non-validity of a law.
As of the aforesaid case of Marburry versus Madison, the practice of reviewing 
the constitutionality of controversial laws invited a sharp debate, but at the end 
it was accepted as a good practice for guarding the system of democracy which 
only rely on the principle of ‘majority rule’. This review mechanism became 
later on nown as ‘judicial review’ to be practiced continuously, not only by the 
Federal Supreme Court of the United States of America, but also the Supreme 
Court of the states and even in all over the judiciary levels. It is such a system 
that later on is named the ‘decentralized model of judicial review’ followed by 
other states, mainly by states with a ‘common law’ tradition. ‘Judicial review’ is 
conducted by all courts, without the need to form a new institution at all.
Nevertheless, that good practice which has already been commenced as of 
the year 1803 in the United States of America, could only be accepted in the 
environment of the Continental Western European ‘civil law’ states at the end 
of the 19th century. A lot of scholars in Germany and in France have discussed 
the importance of ‘judicial review’ to be implemented in the system of the civil 
law of Continental Europe. Nevertheless, its implementation in the practice 
occurred only following the adoption of the idea of Hans Kelsen regarding the 
establishment of the Ƥrst Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) in Austria. 
The idea of a Constitutional Court independent from the Supreme Court and 
the Court of State Administration (Verwaltungsgerichtshof), became contained 
in the New Constitution of Austria only in 1919 and only one year later, namely 
in 1920, the Ƥrst Constitutional Court in the world was established by virtue of a 
1͡  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Model-Model Pengujian Konstitusional di Berbagai Negara, Kopres, Jakarta, 2005.
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law. All the functions of the constitutional judiciary became integrated into the 
jurisdiction of this Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), so that it was 
mentioned that the model of constitutional review conducted by this Austrian 
Constitutional Court is a “centralized model of judicial review.” As a result of 
the thought of Hans Kelsen, this Austrian model is also named the “Kelsenian 
Model of Judicial Review.”
The third model, which is slightly diơerent is the model of ‘constitutional 
review’ in France. In the French system as of the year 1958, a Council of the 
Constitution (Conseil Constitutionnel) which is not a Constitutional Court 
(Corte Constitutionnel) was established.20 Its wor mechanism is also slightly 
diơerent from the Austrian and German Constitutional Court, as it is not a 
‘judicial review’ but a ‘judicial preview’, namely following the bills are approved 
by the parliament and prior to endorsement by the President, there is time to 
conduct a review by the Council of the Constitution (Conseil Constitutionnel). 
If a bill has been submitted for review to the Council of the Constitution, the 
President would only endorse it if the Council of the Constitution resolved 
that the bill is constitutional. Besides, as of the year 2010, the French Council 
of the Constitution also obtains a new authority to decide on petitions from 
parties having a case in an ordinary court regarding the constitutionality of the 
provisions being made to be a base by the parties to litigate or a base for the 
prosecutor general to accuse a defendant.21
This French model, particularly with regard to the ‘a priori’ mechanism of 
‘judicial review’ can be said to be very diơerent from the model of the United 
States of America and the Kelsenian model. The positive side is, the system of 
legal norms can be more stable in its implementation. However, problems of 
injustice due to the legal norms used to be discovered only when the laws are 
enforced in practice, cannot be settled through eơorts of ‘judicial review’ to the 
20  Ale Stoe eet, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective, e aeǣ ord 
iersity Press, 1͡͡2, hal.͜6Ǧ͜͟.
21  As o the 1st o arh 2010, the oil o the ostittio o 	rae also reeies petitios to reie posterior smitted y 
idiidal ities litiati i ort y Ƥli a petitio to the oil o the ostittio to odt reie o the ostittioality 
o proisios o las ei made a ase or proseti or laim aaist it.
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Council of the Constitution. This might be the wea side of this review model 
of the French Council of the Constitution. Nevertheless, many states inƪuenced 
by the French legal system have imitated the pattern of the Council of the 
Constitution France. The remaining democratic states with a ‘civil law’ tradition, 
save to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, almost all follow the Kelsenian pattern. 
The average of the new democratic states, including those stemming from the 
communist regimes, following their reform and becoming democracies, they 
always follow with the establishment of a Constitutional Court according to this 
Kelsenian model.22 Whereas the commonwealth states (the Commonwealth), save 
to the United Kingdom, and states inƪuenced by the constitutional system of 
the United States of America, all have developed a “decentralized model” lie 
that in the United States of America. All the authorities of ‘constitutional review’ 
are conducted by courts culminating at the Federal Supreme Court.
We may say that nowadays, almost all states have already this constitutional 
judiciary mechanism with the intention: (a) to guarantee the uprightness and 
the guarding of the constitution in a democratic system, (b) to ensure the 
uprightness of justice as a counterweight of freedom and simultaneously to 
ensure the unity of the system being in a state through system integration of 
controlling norms, (c) to ensure and to protect the freedom and basic rights 
of the citizens, and (d) to protect human rights as fundamental rights, (e) to 
chec the trend of ‘abuse of power’ mainly in the execution of ‘the power for 
rule-making’, (f) to safeguard the balance between the principle of ‘majority 
rule’ and the ‘minority rights’, (g) to muster the aspirations of living together in 
one vessel of a modern constitutional state which may motivate and guide the 
pace of the development of civilization of the citizens organized in a vessel of 
a state.23 There are exceptions as states lie only (a) the United Kingdom,24 (b) 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands,25 (c) several remaining communist countries, 
or (d) several other states which are yet to embrace the principle of democracy.26
22  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Model-Model Pengujian Konstitusi di Berbagai Negara, Kopres, Jakarta, 2006. om 
iser, Judicial Review in 
New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, amride iersity Press, amride, 2003.
23  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia, PSǦ	, Jakarta, 200͜.
2͜  a lier, Constitutional Reform in the UK, ord iersity Press, 2003, pae ͡5.
25  Vide also ilaire arett, Constitutional and Administrative Law, laedish P. Ltd, 200͜, pae ͠͠.
26  om 
isr, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, amride iersity Press, 2003.
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The Constitutional Court of Indonesia
By its early development, when Indonesia was preparing its independent 
constitution in 1945, the idea of the establishment of a Constitutional Court had 
been discussed at the proposal of Prof. Muhammad Yamin. Nevertheless, his idea 
was still integrated into the function and the authority of the Supreme Court, 
and this was rejected by Prof. Soepomo as it was deemed not yet the time.27 
By the time, the importance of maing a comparison with a resembling court 
which was already existing in Austria and Czechoslovaia. It is just Ƥnally, that 
the idea of reviewing the constitutionality of the laws per se was not accepted 
yet by ‘the founding leaders’ of Indonesia who formulated the Constitution of 
1945. One among the reasons was that the formulators of the Constitution of 
1945 were still quite inƪuenced by the legal tradition of the Netherlands which 
embraced the principle of “de wet is onschendbaar”, namely that the laws cannot 
be rated or challenged by a judge.
Following the Reformation of 1999-2002, the idea of ‘judicial review’ and 
the establishment of the Constitutional Court gained its momentum to be 
adopted into the Third Amendment of the Constitution of 1945 in the year 
2001 and the Fourth Amendment in the year 2002. According to Article III of 
the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution of 1945, “The Constitutional 
Court will be established the latest on the 17th of August 2003 and prior to its 
establishment, all its authorities will be conducted by the Supreme Court.” With 
the passing of the Law Number 24 of 2003 regarding the Constitutional Court 
on the 13th of August 2003, and the designation of nine Constitutional Justices 
based on a decision of the President on the 15th of August 2003, and who had 
taen the oath of oƥce on the 16th of August, 2003, the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Indonesia was formally established.
The formal authorities of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Indonesia comprise: 
2͟  Jimly Asshiddiqie, The Constitutional Law of Indonesia: A Comprehensive Overview, aell Asia, 200͡.
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1) The constitutional review of Laws;
2) Dispute of constitutional authority among state institutions;
3) Disputes regarding the result of general elections;
4) The dissolution of political parties; and 
5) Impeachment against the president/vice the president.28
Legal subjects who have ‘legal standing’ being eligible to Ƥle a petition for 
a case:
1) For ‘judicial review’ case: (a) individuals or group of citizens, (b) public legal 
entities, (c) corporate legal entities, (d) an institution of the state;
2) For disputes of state institutions, an institution the authorities of which is 
determined by the Constitution;29
3) For cases of Disputes on the Result of General Elections: (a) candidates or 
participants of a general election or public organizations acnowledged as 
a party eligible  to represent the interest of the voters;
4) For cases of the dissolution of political parties, for the time being (based 
on the provisions of the prevailing laws) only the Government is entitled 
to Ƥle a petition for such a case. Nevertheless, the government should be 
prohibited to Ƥle a petition.30 As the government is led by the President 
supported by Political Parties being winners of a general election, it is quite 
improper if he/she is given the right to demand the dissolution of a political 
party being a political adversary of the government. Therefore, in the future 
it is the public who should be given the right to demand the dissolution of 
a political party, not the government; and 
5) For cases demanding ‘impeachment’ against the President and/or the Vice 
President, it is the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 
DPR) which is eligible to Ƥle a petition in the Constitutional Court.31
2͠  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Hukum Acara Pengujian Undang-Undang, aaraƤdo, Jakarta, 200͜.
2͡  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Sengketa Antarlembaga Negara, Kopres, Jakarta, 200͜.
30  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Kebebasan Berserikat, Pembubaran Partai Politik, dan Mahkamah Konstitusi, Kopres, Jakarta, 2006.
31  amda oela, Impeachment Presiden: Alasan Tindak Pidana Pemberhentian Presiden Menurut UUD 1945, Kopres, Jakarta, 2011.
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The Dynamics of the Function of the Constitutional Judiciary in the Future
Besides the authorities used to be handled by the Constitutional Court 
variably in various states nowadays, there are also several functions of the 
constitutional judiciary which might be developed in the future. Noted are 
also several functions of the constitutional judiciary which have been used to 
be implemented in practice in several states, but not in other several states. If 
described in all, the following matters can be put forward:
1) Constitutional Review32 (abstract norm and concrete norm, a priori and 
posterior, judicial and executive review, constitutional question, constitutional 
challenge, constitutional complaint)33. For instance, the French Council of 
the Constitution has commenced to practice the ‘constitutional question’ as 
of the year 2010 whereby the parties litigating in the court can Ƥle a petition 
to the Council of the Constitution to review the constitutionality of an 
article of the laws being made a base in the case. In the future, Indonesia 
may also consider to practice the same.
2) Constitutionally Institutional Disputes Resolution, various conƪicts of 
constitutional authority among state institutions shall be settled through a 
constitutional judiciary. The conƪict of authority among state institutions 
occurred frequently without the existence of a forum which may settle it 
eơectively and eƥciently. To date, disputes of authority which can be turned 
into a case object as referred to, be limited only for authorities which are 
explicitly determined by the Constitution. Nevertheless, in the future, the 
constitutional authority can be extended, not only those explicitly mentioned 
or determined, but to the extent the institutional authority as referred to is 
constitutional in nature and gives rise to a dispute with another institution in 
its implementation as well as with another legal subject or state institution, 
then such a case may also be deemed as a dispute of constitutional authority 
of a state institution.
32  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Pengantar Ilmu Hukum Tata Negara, aaraƤdo, Jakarta, 200͟; ad Perihal Undang-Undang, Siar 
raƤka, 
Jakarta, 200͠;
33   this ǲostittioal omplaitǳ vide  ea 
ede Pala, Pengaduan Konstitutional: Upaya Hukum terhadap Pelanggaran 
Hak-Hak Konstitusional Warga Negara, Siar 
raƤka, Jakarta, 2013.
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3) Adjudication of the Freedom of Association and Party Dissolution. Political 
parties and public organizations being a reƪection of the Freedom of 
Association are protected by the Constitution. Therefore, political parties 
and public organizations can only be dissolved if conducted through a 
constitutional judiciary process.34 The demand for dissolution shall not be 
conducted on the initiative of the government but from the members or 
public citizens voting for political parties and members of or public citizens 
in general for the dissolution of public organizations. The objective is (i) to 
protect the freedom of organization peacefully and constitutionally, and (ii) 
to protect the public from others organizing themselves to spread hatred 
and hostilities as well as treason against the constitutional state;
4) Democratic Electoral Result Disputes Resolution.35 The function of dispute 
settlement regarding the result of general elections, in my opinion, should 
indeed be settled by the constitutional judiciary. The reason is, general 
elections and as such also political parties are the pillars of democracy and 
constitution. Therefore, it would be more proper if it be settled by a system of 
constitutional judiciary and not by an ordinary judiciary. Moreover, the nature 
of the judiciary which has to be fast and its management of examination 
shall also be ‘judex facti’ in nature and simultaneously ‘judex juris’ render 
the examination in a high court as well as in the Supreme Court improper. 
Nowadays people elect directly the following oƥces: (i) the President and 
the Vice President, (ii) Governors and Vice Governors, (iii) Regents and 
Vice Regents, (iv) Mayors and Vice Mayors, (v) Members of the DPR, (vi) 
Members of the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, 
DPD), (vii) Members of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) of the Provinces, (viii) Members 
of the DPRD of the Regencies (Kabupaten), and (ix) Members of the DPRD 
of the Cities (Kota). 
3͜  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Kebebasan Berserikat, Pembubaran Partai Politik, dan Mahkamah Konstitusi, Kopres, Jakarta, 2006; ǲhe dea 
o Soial ostittioǣ stittioaliatio ad ostittioaliatio o Pli Lie o iil Soietyǳ, LP3ES, Jakarta, 2015;
35  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Menegakkan Etika Penyelenggara Pemilu, aaraƤdo, Jakarta, 2013.
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5) The impeachment of ‘Directly’ Elected Oƥcials, including the elected 
president and/or vice president, the elected governor, etc. In order to 
be consistent with the judiciary on the result of general elections, then 
the mechanism of dismissal of an oƥcer produced by a general election 
should also only be conducted through the mechanism of ‘impeachment’ 
which involves the participation of the judiciary forum and political forum 
simultaneously. In this case, for the ‘impeachment’ of oƥcers directly elected 
by people, the constitutional judiciary should better be given a role for 
legal veriƤcation on such base, the political forum is given the authority to 
impose the sanction of dismissal as it should be. This is consistent with the 
mechanism of impeachment against the president/vice president, namely that 
following the Constitutional Court has succeeded to proof and determine the 
element of mistae of the President or the Vice President, it is the forum of 
the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) 
which will impose the sanction of dismissal against the President and/or 
the Vice President as it should be. 36
The aforesaid second function up to the Ƥfth function are related with 
cases involving ‘concrete norms’, whereas the Ƥrst function, judicial review, may 
be related to an ‘abstract review’ and may also be a ‘concrete review’, lie for 
instance it is related with an ‘individual complaint against the state’ assessed to 
have violated the human rights of the victim which in Indonesia is conducted 
through the Court of Human Rights. However, the focus of the Constitutional 
Court should be better be directed to handle ‘abstract cases’ only, rather than 
‘concrete cases’ lie cases of Human Rights violations be better ept by the 
Supreme Court and its rans for the handling thereof. As such, in the future, 
the Constitutional Court shall remain focused on eơorts to handle cases related 
to eơorts of ‘constitutional review’ on the ‘abstract norms’ only.
Nevertheless, to the extent it involves this ‘constitutional review on abstract 
norms’, many scopes can be imagined in the frame of strengthening these 
36  ompare ith the mehaism o impeachment o the Presidet o the ited States o Ameria hih emraes the presidetial 
oermet system, ad the mehaism o impeachment as pratied i the eiromet o states emrai parliametaria 
oermet system or semiǦpresidetial oermet system.
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functions of the constitutional judiciary in the future. The vertical and horizontal 
hierarchical system of legal norms should be well integrated and be subject 
to one unity of review system only. What is practiced in Indonesia and also 
in South Korea is dualistic in nature by diơerentiating between review of the 
constitutionality of the laws and review of the legality of the regulations of the 
laws beneath the laws can be deemed to not assuring an equitable and eƥcient 
legal certainty, as well as it does not assist eơorts to develop an integrated legal 
system under the control of the constitution being the highest law.
In order to overcome various burdens of cases, the wor mechanism of the 
constitutional judiciary can also be developed variably through two means which 
should be available simultaneously, namely the review by a superior executive 
oƥcer and/or review by the constitutional judiciary through ‘review’ or ‘preview’. 
As such, the process and mechanism of the review can be developed through 
several means as follow, namely: (a) executive preview, (b) executive review, (c) 
judicial preview, and/or (d) judicial review.37
In the practice in Indonesia now, ‘Executive preview’ is conducted by the 
Central Government casu quo the Ministry of Home Aơairs against the material 
as well as formal validity of a product of a Regional Regulation deemed to be 
contrary to the regulation of the central government, particularly the Laws. A 
‘preview’ is conducted prior to a Regional Regulation is endorsed and published 
in a Regional Gazette. Nevertheless, following a Regional Regulation (Peraturan 
Daerah, Perda) is valid and in force, the Central Government remains to be 
given the authority by Laws to revoe or to cancel regional regulations deemed 
contrary to the laws of the central government by granting a right to the respective 
regional government to submit an objection by Ƥling a petition directly to the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is given the authority to state its agreement 
on a decision to cancel a Regional Regulation by the Central Government, or 
otherwise to justify the Regional Regulation and ordering the revocation of a 
decision cancelling the aforesaid Regional Regulation to the Central Government. 
I name this mechanism the “executive preview” and “executive review” which 
have been implemented in practice. 
3͟  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Perihal Undang-Undang, Siar 
raƤka, Jakarta, 200͠.
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Meanwhile, the mechanism of ‘judicial review’ which has been practiced 
indeed by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court to date either against 
the constitutionality of laws or against the legality of a regulation beneath the 
laws. Besides, in my view, the Constitutional Court is also authorized to review 
the constitutionality of either a bill pending to formal legalization to become a 
law or a Government Regulation in Lieu of Laws (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti 
Undang-Undang, Perpu) pending to its submission to the People’s Representatives 
Council. If a Perpu having been stipulated by the President violates human 
rights and obviously will give rise to serious casualties, it should not be that 
the Constitutional Court being the supervisor of democracy and guardian of the 
constitution being the highest law to sit idle and wait for the political process 
in the DPR (Parliament) while openly witnessing casualties as a result of the 
validity of a Perpu being proven to be unconstitutional. Such is also with a bill 
which have been stipulated by the DPR, awaiting the formal endorsement by 
the President within 30 days, shall not wait to review the constitutionality of 
such bill, if it has been Ƥled by parties feeling aggrieved of their constitutional 
rights. Let alone is the constitutional loss as referred to, is lined to serious 
human rights. This mechanism can be mentioned as ‘judicial preview’ which shall 
be conducted by the Constitutional Court for the upholding of the constitution 
and the constitutional democracy.
III. CONCLUSION
Such are several developments, in the world as well as in Indonesia, the 
information of which can be shared with the participants. All states shall be open 
to learning and imitate whatsoever and from wheresoever where there are good 
examples to be developed and implemented in the respective states. Indonesia 
also learned from the other states for the establishment of the Constitutional 
Court, including from 78 states which have institutionalized the mechanism 
of ‘constitutional review’ earlier into a system of their respective constitutions. 
Therefore, if there are one or two states perceiving that the Constitutional 
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Court of Indonesia imitates one among those states, I may ensure that such is 
incorrect. Which is correct is that the Constitutional Court of Indonesia has 
learned all the way from the good and the not good things from 78 states as 
reƪected in the boo of compilation of ‘constitutional rules of constitutional 
adjudication in 78 countries’ which has been published only in the year 2003,38 
but has been made a discussion material as of the year 2001, when the ideas of 
the Constitutional Court was being drafted and planned in the formulation of 
the Constitution of 1945 and for the preparation of the Ƥrst bill regarding the 
Constitutional Court in the years of 2002-2003.39
The world nowadays has indeed become more open. Constitutional values and 
norms among states have increasingly achieved a very smooth level of development 
and open for receiving from and rendering inƪuence to wheresoever for the 
interest of universal manind. All of us should no way ignore the importance 
of the factors of history, political systems, economy, and socio-culture of the 
respective states which would certainly determine the dynamics of the progress 
of a nation and state. However, the willingness to learn the exemplar and the 
giving of exemplar in inter-communication among nations and among manind 
in the era of globalization nowadays, is one which cannot be avoided.
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